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How are decisions made in the euro area? And how democratic are they? These 
questions moved to the centre of the debate during the euro crisis. Under tremendous 
time pressure, solutions had to be found for stabilising the euro. New institutions 
and rules were created such as the European Stability Mechanism, the Banking Union 
and the Fiscal Compact. Who makes the decisions in the Eurozone today? Is there a 
democratic deficit? Does the currency union need better control mechanisms – or are 
the old ones good enough?
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“I have an ‘impossibility theorem’ for the global 
economy that is like that. It says that democracy, 
national sovereignty and global economic 
integration are mutually incompatible: we can 
combine any two of the three, but never have all 
three simultaneously and in full.”
Dani Rodrik, Economist at Harvard University
in his weblog on 27 June 2007
Who decides upon economic 
policy in the Eurozone?
The responsibility for budgetary and 
economic policy in the Eurozone is 
largely in the hands of the member 
states. Responsibility for the common 
monetary policy was handed over to 
the European Central Bank (ECB), how-
ever. As a result, there has been a mon-
etary union, but no economic union as 
yet since the Maastricht Treaty.
The budgetary policies of the euro- 
area countries are subject to Euro-
pean rules. The members of the  
Eurozone must comply with an 
agreed set of  fiscal rules that are 
designed to keep their budgets in 
check and protect against excessive 
debt. The European Commission 
monitors compliance and can impose 
fines in the event of any breaches.
Collective economic policy decisions 
are primarily made in the  Euro-
group where the finance ministers of 
the Eurozone countries meet. Since 
2011, national economic policies have 
also been coordinated in the European 
Semester. The focus of coordination 
here is on budgetary policy, national  
structural reforms and the avoid-
ance of excessive macro economic 
imbalances. Eurozone countries can 
theoretically be sanctioned for not 
complying with the rules. In practice, 
however, threats of punishment have 
proven to be toothless.
A majority of Europeans support the 
euro, but many do not accept the 
way the EU handles economic issues. 
According to a Eurobarometer survey 
in April 2017, almost three-quarters of 
the Eurozone population support the 
common currency. At the same time, 
many have doubted since the crisis 
that the euro can achieve its original 
stability and growth promises. A sur-
vey published by the Pew Research 
Centre in June 2017 showed that over 
half of the surveyed EU citizens are 
dissatisfied with economic policy 
management in Europe. The approval 
ratings in Greece, Italy and France 
are especially low.
Fiscal rules
A package of European 
rules that sets the maxi-
mum levels for new debt 
and accumulated debt 
in Eurozone countries. 
The package includes 
the Stability and Growth 
Pact as well as the Fiscal 
Compact and the two 
legislative initiatives Six-
Pack and Two-Pack, which 
further strengthened  
the original rules during  
the crisis.
Eurogroup
The finance ministers of 
the Eurozone countries 
discuss questions related 
to the common currency 
here. Their most important 
task is to ensure close 
coordination of economic 
policy in the euro area. 
Despite its informal 
character, the group 
made essentially all the 
important decisions on 
crisis management and on 
the rescue of individual 
countries during the crisis.
“Do we need something like an economic government 
[for the Eurozone]? I am quite in favour of this.  
A European finance minister? In principle, I also agree 
with this. [...] If there is a common legal foundation,  
I can also imagine many other things.”
Angela Merkel, German Chancellor 
in an interview with Die Zeit on 6 July 2017
“In order to invest more than today, we want a 
budget for the Eurozone, passed by a Eurozone 
parliament and implemented by an economics 
and finance minister for the Eurozone.”
Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic of France
in his election programme “En Marche!” 2017
Sharing of risk
This refers to the sharing 
of liability risks or burdens 
among Eurozone countries, 
for example in the area of 
public finance. Risks can be 
shared indirectly through 
the capital markets or ECB 
policy and the prices for  
government bonds or 
directly through payments 
between countries.
No-bailout clause
A provision in the European 
Treaties that rules out any 
liability of the EU and all 
member states for the debts 
of individual EU countries. 
The rule was created in 
order to motivate euro-area 
countries to show budgetary 
discipline. They should not 
harbour hopes that they 
would receive backing later 
in the event of imprudent 
fiscal policy.
Does the Eurozone suffer 
from a lack of democracy?
During the crisis, a web of interwo-
ven, partially contradictory sources 
of legitimacy emerged in the Euro-
zone. Before the crisis, policy for the 
euro was mainly legitimised through 
the member-state governments. The 
changes to the euro area’s architecture 
during the crisis mean that this is no 
longer adequate as a democratic basis.
First, the Eurozone countries have 
further reduced their national deci-
sion-making authority. In the crisis, 
many collective decisions were made 
and new institutions created, going 
far beyond the loose pre-crisis coor-
dination. This includes the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), whose 
reform programmes entail deep 
cuts for the affected crisis countries. 
What’s more, the rules for handling 
ailing banks or the strengthening of 
budgetary controls through the Fiscal 
Compact have further reduced the 
autonomy of Eurozone countries.
Second, parliaments remain largely 
left out of the process. Without direct 
control by the European Parliament, 
for example, the Troika consisting  
of representatives from the European 
Commission, the ECB and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund reached 
decisions with far-reaching conse-
quences in crisis countries. 
Third, the crisis led to a  sharing 
of risk without any fundamental 
changes in the way decisions are 
democratically controlled in the  
Eurozone. The ECB played a key role 
here: By buying government bonds 
and coming from the signal given by 
its president, Mario Draghi, that it 
would do “whatever it takes” to save 
the euro, the ECB defused the crisis 
in individual countries. Furthermore, 
the ESM effectively meant the end  
of the  no-bailout clause in the Euro-
zone: A member state can now be 
helped with direct payments that are 
provided or guaranteed by other euro- 
area countries. 
The euro crisis showed that the Euro-
zone must improve its governance. 
Although additional steps towards 
integration and the EU Treaty amend-
ments required to achieve this are 
difficult, the conditions for institu-
tional reforms in the euro area after 
the latest national elections are prob-
ably better than they have been for a 
long time.
“Democracy deserved a boost in euro-related 
matters. We just delivered it. Let the people 
decide.”
Yanis Varoufakis, Finance Minister of Greece
prior to the Greek referendum on the euro bailout  
package via Twitter on 26 June 2015
SCENARIO 1
Expansion of the European  
Stability Mechanism 
In this first scenario, Eurozone institutions that are founded on 
intergovernmental agreements are strengthened. This includes the 
expansion of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). It could re-
ceive additional competencies such as economic analysis of member 
states, monitoring of national budgetary and economic policies or 
penalty options in the event of non-implementation of rules and 
required reforms. Should countries experience economic difficulties, 
the same automatic mechanisms are always activated. The ESM 
would become a kind of early warning system for the Eurozone 
in the hands of member state governments, which would have to 
account for their actions, as before, to their national parliaments.
In this scenario, the reforms aim at enhancing proper implemen-
tation of common euro-area policies. However, there are doubts 
as to whether the rules monitored on an intergovernmental basis 
can really be implemented: The budgetary rules in the Stability and 
Growth Pact were often breached without – theoretically available –  
sanctions being imposed. Experience has also shown that a strict 
rule book leaves less leeway for action in the event of unanticipated 
economic shocks. A further strengthening of intergovernmental 
controls also entails a weakening of the European Commission and 
the European Parliament.
SCENARIO 2
A federal Eurozone 
The second scenario is based on an extensive sharing of risk and 
sovereignty in the euro area where the competencies for economic 
policy are anchored more at EU level. This includes turning the 
ESM into a European Treasury that coordinates and monitors not 
just bailout packages, but also the fiscal and economic policies of 
euro-area countries. As opposed to the first scenario, the Treasury 
would be under EU management, for example under a European 
finance minister representing the interests of the Eurozone as a 
whole. Such an office could also be given its own investment budget 
in order to compensate for shocks and to reward reforms. This 
scenario would come with a substantial strengthening of democratic 
control by the European Parliament.
The “federal quantum leap”, which this scenario requires, appears 
to be unlikely for now despite increasing public support within 
the monetary union. Hardly any member state is ready to accept a 
further shift of competencies to the European level and to deal with 
the ratification process required for treaty amendments, including 
by a referendum vote in some countries.
SCENARIO 3
Simplification prior to expansion  
of the euro architecture
Improving the governance of the Eurozone here implies making 
the current decision-making structures and democratic control 
mechanisms more transparent as a first step. Only then would any 
additional steps towards integration be negotiated. Inter alia, the 
position of president of the Eurogroup could be assumed by a full-
time official chair conducting any negotiations on aid programmes. 
The ESM could be built up financially and be brought into the Euro-
pean legal framework. Furthermore, existing rules on budgetary policy 
could be simplified and country-specific recommendations in the 
European Semester reduced. The advantage of this scenario is that no 
amendments to the European Treaties would be necessary initially.
In the medium term, the ESM’s role could be expanded to that of 
lender of last resort if member states are ready for this politically. 
A European finance minister could occupy the position of president 
and double up as commissioner and president of the Eurogroup. This 
individual could answer to a joint committee of delegates from the 
European Parliament and national parliaments that could veto any 
ESM decisions via a qualified majority vote.
“Understandably, the countries in the Eurozone want to be able to decide upon their economic policy 
autonomously. In a monetary union, however, a certain degree of steering is necessary to shape policy 
coherently and to achieve compliance with rules. Therefore, the gradual strengthening of European 
institutions is important to improve the governance of the Eurozone – even if it is difficult.”
Dr. Katharina Gnath 
The author is a Senior Project Manager at the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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59 percent of Europeans support the euro, which is the highest level since autumn 2009. In the 
Eurozone, approval of the common currency is even higher at 72 percent.
Source: Eurobarometer, April 2017.
Since 2010, Eurozone countries with payment difficulties have received loans from the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and its predecessor, the EFSF. Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus 
have left the ESM in the meantime. Only Greece still has an ongoing programme – now the third.
Source: ESM.
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In the publication series “Europa briefing”, the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
and the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin cover key topics of European 
politics and present possible scenarios: What is the problem?  
What might happen next? And what can politics do now? 
You will find all the publications from the joint project here:  
www.strengthentheeuro.eu 
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